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Abstract
Social networking sites supporting federated identities
offer a convenient and increasingly popular mechanism
for cross-site authentication. Unfortunately, they also ex-
acerbate many privacy and tracking risks. We propose
Crypto-Book, an anonymizing layer enabling cross-site
authentication while reducing these risks.
Crypto-Book relies on a set of independently managed
servers that collectively assign each social network iden-
tity a public/private keypair. Only an identity’s owner
learns all the private key shares, and can therefore con-
struct the private key, while all participants can obtain
any user’s public key, even if the corresponding private
key has yet to be retrieved. Having obtained an appropri-
ate key set, a user can then leverage anonymous authenti-
cation techniques such as linkable ring signatures to log
into third-party web sites while preserving privacy.
We have implemented a prototype of Crypto-Book and
demonstrate its use with three applications: a Wiki sys-
tem, an anonymous group communication system, and a
whistleblower submission system. Our results show that
for anonymity sets of size 100, Crypto-Book login takes
0.56s for signature generation by the client, 0.38s for sig-
nature verification on the server, and requires 5.6KB of
communication bandwidth.
1 Introduction
Social networks have gained widespread popularity
among users as a way to manage their online identity
across the web. While protocols like OAuth [22] and
OpenID [39] allow users to maintain a single set of cre-
dentials for cross-site authentication, such federated lo-
gin can leak privacy-sensitive profile information [19],
making the user’s online activity more easily tracked.
To protect themselves, users could forego using so-
cial network identities altogether, or limit the content of
their social profiles. Ideally, users could leverage their
social network profiles but in a way as to prevent third-
party sites from accessing sensitive information. While
anonymous authentication protocols exist, their practi-
cality depend on such technologies as PGP and personal
X509 certificates – subjects most users lack the knowl-
edge or motivation to use effectively.
The idea of leveraging social networks as a basis for
privacy preserving identities was suggested in a recent
workshop paper [35]. Building on this idea, we present
Crypto-Book, a framework enabling users to login to
third party sites anonymously or pseudonymously via
existing social network identities. Crypto-Book inter-
poses an anonymity layer between existing identity man-
agement systems such as social networks and the third-
party sites users may wish to log into. Crypto-Book pre-
vents the social network site from learning which exter-
nal sites a user accesses, and prevents the external site
from learning which social network user accessed their
site or which other external sites the same user has ac-
cessed.
Figure 1 shows a high level overview of the architec-
ture. The client initially authenticates with a federated
ID provider. The client then collects their private key
and other people’s public keys from Crypto-Book which
contains a set of key servers. The client generates an
anonymous signature using these keys and uses that to
anonymouly log in to third party applications.
Users obtain a component of their public/private key
pair from each Crypto-Book key server and use a client-
side Crypto-Book module to combine these parts and
produce their composite key pair. The key servers have a
split trust design such that all key servers must be com-
promised in order to compromise a user’s private key.
The key servers additionally supply a user with the public
keys corresponding to any other social networking iden-
tities. The key servers make use of existing technologies,
such as OAuth, to verify the social network identity.
Crypto-Book performs anonymous authentication
with the acquired private and public keys using linkable
ring signatures [30], which prove that the signer owns
one of a list of public keys, without revealing which key.
This property is particularly useful in scenarios where
trust is associated with a group rather than an individual,
such as a journalist verifying that the source of a leaked
document is a member of a particular organization.
Crypto-Book addresses some common concerns with
online anonymity. First, linkable ring signatures prevent
a single social network identity from performing sock-
puppetry or Sybil attacks [17] on websites or applica-
tions. Crypto-Book preserves whatever Sybil attack re-
sistance the underlying social network offers. Second,
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Figure 1: High level system diagram
due to the split trust key server design, a user need only
trust that at least one of the key servers is honest.
We present a prototype implementation and evaluation
of the Crypto-Book framework using three applications:
Crypto-Wiki, Crypto-Dissent, and Crypto-Drop. Crypto-
Wiki leverages Crypto-Book to provide anonymous, yet
linkable editing in a collaborative environment. Crypto-
Dissent shows how the integration of anonymous authen-
tication with anonymous communication systems can
better protect the identities of the users of those sys-
tems. Crypto-Drop provides anonymous document sign-
ing using Crypto-Book identities, allowing for verifiable
leaks without compromising privacy. We built Crypto-
Wiki using MediaWiki, the software behind Wikipedia,
and Crypto-Dissent using Dissent [6, 52], an anonymous
group communication tool. Crypto-Drop extends the Se-
cureDrop open-source whistleblower platform. Our ex-
perimental results show that a set of 100 keys requires
0.56s for Crypto-Book signature generation on a modern
laptop, 0.38s for signature verification by the web server,
and 5.6KB of communication bandwidth to transmit the
signature.
Crypto-Book’s focus is providing convenient and us-
able anonymous authentication, but it does not by itself
address the general problem of anonymous communi-
cation, especially under traffic analysis, as systems like
Tor [15], Dissent [7, 53], and Aqua [29] do. Crypto-Book
is synergistic with such systems but also usable indepen-
dently, when a casual level of anonymity is desired but
the user does not wish to incur the performance costs of
full anonymous forwarding.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Privacy-preserving anonymous and pseudonymous
authentication using social network identities.
• A multi-provider key distribution protocol preventing
any single social network from impersonating a user.
• Experiments demonstrating the usability and practi-
cality of Crypto-Book for authentication.
2 Background and Motivation
It is often difficult to strike an appropriate balance be-
tween the following objectives:
• Supporting free speech and free association, and fight-
ing censorship and oppression.
• Improving the quality of public discourse. Hidden be-
hind an anonymous veil, people often say or do things
they might otherwise not.
These two objectives are often at odds with each other.
While Wikipedia would like to allow anonymous editing,
such privileges are often abused for vandalism or sock-
puppetry. We would like a system that allows users to
edit pages without revealing their identity but at the same
time allows the Wikipedia site administrators to sanction
site abusers. We used our Crypto-Book framework to
implement such an application, Crypto-Wiki which we
describe in Section 9.1.
Another example placing free speech and quality of
discourse are at odds is the realm of anonymous chat.
A covert organization, for example, may wish to discuss
sensitive issues without revealing their individual identi-
ties while at the same time limiting access to their dis-
cusssion to people within their organization, in an effort
to prevent repressive authorities or other undesirable out-
siders from viewing their communications. In response,
we built Crypto-Dissent, an application providing such
functionality, on top of our Crypto-Book framework. We
describe the application in detail in Section 9.2.
Whistleblowing provides another such scenario, as a
journalist taking possession of sensitive documents may
wish to authenticate the documents without compromis-
ing the anonymity of the source. Crypto-Drop accommo-
dates both parties by allowing documents to be signed as
an anonymous member of a larger group that is credible
as a whole. Crypto-Drop is described in detail in Sec-
tion 9.3.
2.1 Federated Identity
We now give a brief overview of federated identity, fo-
cusing on OAuth [22, 23]. A federated identity proto-
col allows a user to present credentials from an iden-
tity provider with which they have an account, such as
Google+/Facebook/PayPal, and authenticate themselves
to a third-party website without revealing their actual lo-
gin information (password). Many protocols, such as
OAuth, also enable the third-party to gain limited access
to the user’s resources stored by the identity provider.
OpenID [39, 40] is another widely used federated iden-
tity protocol.
A typical OAuth login proceeds as follows, supposing
a Facebook user wishes to log into StackOverflow.
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1. The user clicks Log in with Facebook on StackOver-
flow.
2. StackOverflow redirects the user to Facebook where
they login using their Facebook credentials.
3. The user gives permission for StackOverflow to ac-
cess and/or modify their data (read contacts, post sta-
tus updates and so on).
4. Facebook generates a temporary OAuth access token
that corresponds to the granted permissions.
5. Facebook redirects the user back to StackOverflow,
passing along the access token.
6. StackOverflow can now access the user’s Facebook
resources in line with the permissions granted by the
user by including the access token with each request.
Using a federated identity protocol, a user can authen-
ticate themselves to third party sites without having to
maintain separate accounts for each third party website.
This convenience brings privacy risks, however, of which
Crypto-Book addresses the following:
• The authentication provider learns everywhere the
user logs in using that identity.
• Third party sites learn the user’s true identity.
• Users can be tracked across third party sites.
Crypto-Book does not address the issue of
stolen/compromised social network identities, where the
attacker may get access to all of the user’s accounts via a
federated identity. With this in mind, Crypto-Book does
enable a user to build privacy-preserving identities based
on multiple social networking sites simultaneously – for
example both Facebook and Paypal accounts – requiring
an attacker to compromise accounts on both sites. The
general problem of stolen federated identities remains
outside the scope of this paper, however.
3 Architecture Overview
Figure 2 shows the overall Crypto-Book stack. Tradi-
tionally, Facebook or another federated ID provider pro-
vides an API to an application via OAuth or a similar
protocol. This, however, exposes the user’s identity to
the application. We insert the Crypto-Book layer as a
buffer between the non-anonymous identity API from the
ID provider and a generic, privacy preserving API for ap-
plications.
The Crypto-Book layer consists of two sub-layers:
1. A key assignment function
2. A privacy preserving ID layer
The key assignment function maps public/private key-
pairs to each of the identities from the ID provider. The
keys are then passed to the privacy-preserving ID layer,
which anonymizes them to provide privacy protected IDs
for the application layer through an OAuth API. The key
assignment function uses linkable ring signatures [31] to
maintain a 1-to-1 correspondence between privacy pro-
Figure 2: The Crypto-Book stack
tected IDs and the original IDs, which both ensures cred-
ibility of IDs and allows applications to sanction or block
abusive users – a recourse not possible with traditional
anonymous systems.
4 Threat Model
We make the following assumptions about a potential ad-
versary in the context of our system.
• We assume that the client has the ability to connect to
the key servers through an anonymity network such as
Dissent [7, 53] or Tor [15].
• At least one of the key servers is honest; that is, it does
not share its master key or private keys with anyone
else. We use an (n,n)-threshold scheme [2, 8, 11, 13]
for the key servers (referred to in this paper as an
anytrust scheme).
• A key server provides consistent public and private
keys; given two requests for the same key, it does not
return two different results.
• Dishonest servers may collude with each other to share
master secrets or private keys.
• Key servers can see the IP addresses of clients that
connect to them.
• If an adversary compromises a server they have access
to the master key and all private keys from that server
from that epoch, but not from previous epochs (epoch
details are described in Section 5.5).
• For the single identity provider key distribution
scheme we assume that the resource server provided
by the social network is honest. In this case we rely
on the social network to provide identities and assume
that the social network does not impersonate its users.
• For multiple identity providers key distribution, we as-
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sume that different identity providers (such as PayPal
and Facebook) do not collude with each other to ob-
tain a user’s private key. In this case a single social
network (such as Facebook) cannot compromise any
user’s private key.
5 Key Assignment
In this section we explain how public/private key pairs
are assigned and distributed to social networking ac-
counts. We outline at the overall server model, key dis-
tribution mechanism, key servers and compromise.
5.1 Anytrust Server Model
We use an anytrust server model in our architecture. The
term anytrust was coined by Wolinsky et al. [54] and
refers to an (n,n)-threshold cryptosystem [2, 8, 11, 13]
where, in our case, we have n key servers, and key parts
from all of them are required to construct a private key.
Anytrust is a decentralized client/server network model,
in which each of many clients trust only that at least one
of a smaller but diverse set of servers behaves honestly.
Moreover clients need not know which server to trust,
only that at least one is honest.
We leverage anytrust in our system architecture de-
sign. Under our threat model (Section 4), we assume
only that at least one of the key servers is honest and all
other key servers may be colluding to try to compromise
a client’s private key. For each client, each key server i
generates a private key part ki. The client then uses some
key combining function f that takes each of the private
key parts k0,k1, . . . ,kn and combines them into a com-
posite private key kc = f (k0,k1, . . . ,kn). The combining
function f is such that all n key parts are required to cal-
culate kc and any n− 1 key parts alone provide no in-
formation about the possible value of kc, thus preserving
user privacy for all but n key server failures.
Leveraging an anytrust server model means that we do
not have to rely on a single trusted server that would be
an obvious point of attack. In a single server model an
adversary would have to get access to only that server’s
private keys to compromise a client, however in the
anytrust model an adversary would have to get access to
the private key parts on all of the key servers in order to
compromise the client’s private key.
5.2 Key Distribution Mechanism
We now explain how a client collects their private key.
The primary steps for the client are as follows:
• Anonymously request a link to collect their private
key.
• Authenticate with one or more social networks.
• Collect their private key and other clients’ public keys
from the key servers.
• Anonymously authenticates with third party website
using keys.
Key distribution begins with a client request for their
private key. If the client simply connected to the key
servers and requested their private key, this could com-
promise their anonymity when authenticating with third
party sites as a dishonest key server could collude with
a third party site to perform a timing analysis attack cor-
relating private key pickups with subsequent authentica-
tions to the third party site. To mitigate this, the client
anonymously requests a list of Crypto-Book invitations
to be sent out.
Suppose Alice wants to collect her private key. She
anonymously connects to a key request server (through
an anonymity network) and supplies a list of social
networking IDs (say Bob’s and Charles’), to form an
anonymity set. Each key server then sends out an invita-
tion link to each of the social network accounts (via so-
cial networking message) to sign up and use the Crypto-
Book service. This means no one knows who originally
requested the invitations and hopefully several of the re-
cipients will choose to sign up to the Crypto-Book ser-
vice and collect their private key, improving anonymity
and making cross site timing analysis attacks much more
difficult.
Alice then receives an invitation to sign up to Crypto-
Book. When she clicks the link she is redirected and has
to authenticate herself with one or more social network
identity providers.
5.2.1 Alternative Identity Providers
Crypto-Book supports alternative identity providers for
example different social networks or other online iden-
tity providers such as financial institutions. Crypto-Book
integrates with any federated identity provider that is
OAuth compliant. Users may want to use different iden-
tity providers. For example Alice may not have a Twitter
account, but has a Facebook account whereas Bob may
be the other way around. Support for multiple identity
providers means that more people will have access to the
service. Additionally, these different identity providers
may provide different identity thresholds . For example
bank-confirmed PayPal accounts have a higher barrier to
entry than Facebook accounts. Using a PayPal accounts
may lead to a higher degree of trust in the identities they
represent.
5.2.2 Combined Identities
In addition to supporting alternative identity providers,
Crypto-Book also allows users to authenticate with mul-
tiple identity providers and hence obtain a private key
4
that is tied to all of these accounts. This attests to the
fact that a user has, for example, both a Facebook and a
PayPal account. Key servers may also verify that these
accounts are in the same name and/or have other consis-
tent identifying information associated with them. In the
combined identities case, it is not possible for a single
social network to impersonate the user and obtain their
private key, as they would also need access to the user’s
accounts on the other identity provider sites.
Keys obtained from multiple indentity providers are
combined to create a composite key as follows. Key
servers use the same group parameters (for DSA based
keys) or elliptic curve (for elliptic curve cryptography,
EEC) and then the respective public keys can just be mul-
tiplied togther (DSA) or added (EEC) to create a com-
bined key. The Crypto-Book client simply adds the pri-
vate exponents (DSA) or scalars (EEC) together to obtain
a joint private key.
5.2.3 Private Key Pickup
Returning to our example, after Alice has received an in-
vitation to collect her private key, she clicks the link and
is taken to authenticate with one or more social networks.
Upon authenticating, Alice receives one OAuth token per
key server from each social network. Note that each to-
ken is only compatible with a single key server. If only
one token were provided for all key servers, a malicious
key server could forward the token onto other key servers
to impersonate Alice. Step 1 of Figure 3 shows the client
authenticating with Facebook and PayPal.
Since there is one token per key server, if there are
n key servers, there will be n corresponding Facebook
(or other social network site) apps, each requiring user
authorization. To simplify this process, we provide a
Chrome extension that the user can download to au-
tomatically authorize all key server apps with a single
Facebook signin.
Alice then forwards the appropriate OAuth tokens to
the key servers (each key server receiving a token from
each identity provider) as shown in step 2 of Figure
3. Each key server is tasked with maintaining a pub-
lic/private keypair associated with each social network
identity. The key servers contact the identity providers,
for example Facebook and PayPal, to verify the tokens. If
verification succeeds, the key server distributes its share
of the client’s private key to the client as shown in step
3 of Figure 3. In the case of multiple identity providers,
keys are combines as described in Section 5.2.2.
Once the client has received all private key shares,
they combine them to get their overall composite private
key using a key combining function as described in Sec-
tion 5.1.
An alternative approach to having the client locally run
Figure 3: Client authenticates with online identity
providers
software to collect the keys would be to have an interme-
diary server acting as a trusted web proxy whose job is
is to authenticate the user, then collect their private key
parts on their behalf, assemble them into the private key
and securely return this to the client. The advantage of
this is that the user does not have to run any program lo-
cally themself however they have to trust the web proxy
with their private key.
5.3 Anonymous Authentication
Once a client has obtained their own private key and a
list of public keys corresponding to other Facebook iden-
tities, the client constructs a ring signature [43, 41] with
all the Facebook identities as the anonymity set. Figure 4
shows our system where a user is choosing to have Brad
Pitt, Barack Obama and Tiger Woods in their anonymity
set by entering their Facebook profiles. A ring signature
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Figure 4: Crypto-Book anonymity set selection
has the property that a third party can verify using only
the public keys that the signature was created by one of
the members of the anonymity set. However they cannot
determine which person in the anonymity set specifically
created the signature. Hence they can be used to protect
the anonymity of the user.
The ring signature is now used by the user as a form of
anonymous online identity and could be used in a mul-
titude of different scenarios. For example the user could
anonymously sign a document to give a credible leak,
join an anonymous chat group open only to a specific set
of users, or anonymously comment on blog posts.
5.4 Key Servers
Each of the key servers is tasked with generating a pub-
lic/private keypair for each social networking identity.
There exist primarily two ways that a server could do
this. The first is that a key server could generate fresh
random public/private keypair on each request for either
a public or private key and then store the keypair for fu-
ture reference. The advantage of storing each user’s key-
pair on disk is that is can more quickly be returned to
the user as opposed to the alternative where the public
or private key is calculated each time it is requested by a
client.
The other way for a key server to generate pub-
lic/private keypairs for clients is to hold a master secret
or master key from which each client’s private key may
be created or re-created deterministically on demand to
serve any given request. For example a keyed pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG) such as a keyed-hash
message authentication code (HMAC) could be used
where the master secret is hashed together with the Face-
book username of the client in order to obtain the user’s
private key. The advantage of this technique is that it is
more scalable and requires less storage as the server does
not need to store an increasing number of client keys.
5.5 Compromised Key Servers
One threat that we need to consider is what happens if
a key server’s storage is compromised. For example if
the master key is leaked or if a thief breaks into the data
center and illicitly obtains the key server’s physical hard-
ware. The adversary would obtain access either to all the
private keys saved on disk or, if the master key scheme is
used, would be able to generate and hence obtain that
server’s part of the private key for any client. While
this does not in itself compromise the user’s composite
private key it is still undesirable. We propose an epoch
based scheme to mitigate this vulnerability.
Under this scheme we have the key server work in
epochs, where the key server’s master secret is valid only
during a given epoch and gets randomly reinitialized in
each successive epoch. If we want previously generated
ring signatures to still be verifiable after the epoch, the
server must maintain a list of public keys containing at
least all the public keys generated in that epoch. Then
in subsequent epochs the server will be able to serve re-
quests for older public keys (but not private keys) to al-
low for verification of old ring signatures.
Since the master secret gets randomly reinitialized in
each successive epoch, each user can thus get a new pub-
lic/private keypair in each key server epoch. The key
server is only able to create (or recreate) a client’s private
key for the current epoch so that in case of compromise,
only the user keys in the latest epoch are compromised,
not those of all past epochs. We envisage epochs being
realtively long, of the order of months, or new epochs
triggered in the event of a key server compromise.
The epoch based key scheme used in conjunction with
the anytrust key splitting scheme significantly reduces
the risk of a client’s private key being compromised by
an adversary.
6 Privacy Preservation
In this section we consider how user privacy is preserved
in our architecture. We first look at how anonymity set
choice affects user privacy, then discuss ring signatures
and how they are used to provide k-anonymous authenti-
cation.
6.1 Anonymity Set
One important consideration from the standpoint of
maintaining user anonymity is the selection of the
anonymity set used when generating the ring signature.
One option is to leave it up to the user to construct their
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anonymity set. The benefit of this is that the user may
want the set to correspond to some group of people in
the real world, such as a group of employees all work-
ing in the same corporate division or government depart-
ment. One a hazard of allowing users to choose their own
anonymity set, however, is that they may inadvertently
choose a set that compromises their anonymity. An al-
ternative approach is for the system itself to batch users
together into groups.
In some cases users may benefit from having the op-
tion of defining explicit anonymity sets. For example, a
company employee may want to leak documents of pub-
lic interest to the press but at the same time show that
they come from a credible source. In this case the em-
ployee would like to have the option of choosing their
own anonymity set where all members of the set are em-
ployees at the same company. This way, when a journal-
ist verifies who signed the document, they know for sure
that it came from an employee of the company, they just
do not know which specific employee leaked the docu-
ment. We implement an application that supports this
functionality called Crypto-Drop that we describe in Sec-
tion 9.3.
The way user groups are chosen will almost certainly
vary with application and may have implications for the
degree of privacy protection afforded to users. The ex-
tent of these implications is an interesting area for future
work which we discuss in Section 11.
A possible threat to user privacy comes from the
fact that third party sites may collude to attempt to
deanonymize and uniquely identify users. If a user au-
thenticates themself as a member of a group across many
third party sites, this vector of group membership may
threaten the user’s anonymity. The extent of this risk de-
pends on how the anonymity set is chosen. If different
sites use different groups, for example a user is in group
A on site 1 but group B on site 2, there may be some
risks to user privacy the extent of which would depend
on the way groups are chosen, an interesting line of in-
vestigation for future work that we mention in Section
11.
However if groups are defined by Crypto-Book, users
do not face this risk as they would always be in the same
group regardless of which third party site they logged
into. We propose using this scheme where Crypto-Book
puts users into groups in order to protect user privacy.
6.2 Ring signatures
Ring signatures are a cryptographic scheme proposed by
Rivest et al. [43, 41]. Ring signatures build on group sig-
natures [4] in that a message signed with a ring signature
is endorsed by someone in a particular group of people
however it is difficult to determine which of the group
members’ keys were used to produce the signature. Ring
signatures differ from group signatures in that ring signa-
tures do not require any initial setup and can be created
on an ad hoc basis.
Rivest et al.’s ring signatures are based on each partic-
ipant having a personal RSA public private keypair. The
signer must obtain the public keys of all other parties in
their anonymity set, in addition to their own RSA pri-
vate key in order to generate a ring signature. Rivest et
al.’s ring signatures provide the property of deniability:
Even with access to the private keys, given an RSA ring
signature it is not possible to unmask the original signer.
RSA keys do not support key splitting so a single key
server is used as opposed to an anytrust cloud, however
even if a private key is leaked it does not compromise the
anonymity of existing ring signatures due to the denia-
bility property.
Liu et al.’s [31] proposed linkable ring signatures
(LRS) are based on discrete logarithm DSA [28]keys.
Linkable ring signatures are similar to traditional RSA
ring signatures with the additional property of linkabil-
ity. Linkability refers to the fact that given any two sig-
natures, a third party can determine whether or not they
were produced by the same person. While LRSs provide
linkability, they do not provide forward anonymity in the
way that RSA ring signatures do. If a private key is com-
promised by an attacker, then the attacker may use that
to unmask previously generated LRSs to tell whether or
not they were indeed produced by that private key.
Since DSA based LRSs do not provide deniability, we
cannot trust a single server to maintain the private keys.
To counteract this, a multi-server anytrust [54] cloud
should be used to serve keys as described in Section 5.1.
Linkable ring signatures are used in our architecture
to provide an anonymity preserving identity to a user.
The ring signature may be used to authenticate with a
third party website or service so the third party knows
that the user is a member of a group of users, but the
specific user’s identity is not revealed to the third party,
protecting the user’s privacy and anonymity.
7 OAuth provider
The Crypto-Book architecture serves as an OAuth com-
pliant identitity provider allowing websites that include
a Log in with Facebook button to authenticate users to
similarly include a Log in with Crypto-Book button to
do so anonymously and accountably. Crypto-Book as an
OAuth identity provider works as follows, starting from
when the third-party redirects the user to Crypto-Book to
authenticate:
Crypto-Book presents a challenge to a the user in the
form of a random string that the user is requested to sign
using a linkable ring signature. The user signs the string
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and uploads their signature to Crypto-Book which then
verifies the signature. If the signature is successfully ver-
ified, Crypto-Book obtains the username corresponding
to that user by hashing the linkage tag of the signature.
Crypto-Book then generates an OAuth token and asso-
ciates it with that username, storing the pair in a database,
and redirects the user back to the third party site passing
the OAuth token as a parameter.
The third party site now knows that the user suc-
cessfully authenticated with Crypto-Book. The site can
then include the OAuth token in future requests to query
Crypto-Book for the user’s username and the anonymity
set they authenticated with. The fact that the username
is derived from the linkage tag means that if the user
tries to authenticate multiple times they will always be
given the same anonymous username and thus can be
held accountable for their actions on the third party site in
the same way as a non-anonymous user. Hence Crypto-
Book allows any third-party site or app that is an OAuth-
compatible client to provide anonymous, accountable lo-
gin.
8 Implementation
To demonstrate the feasibility of our architecture, we im-
plemented Crypto-Book. The system allows a user to log
in using Facebook, Paypal, or both, and to connect to the
key servers and collect their private key. We also im-
plemented three applications built on the Crypto-Book
framework, Crypto-Wiki, Crypto-Dissent and Crypto-
Drop. Crypto-Wiki is a Wikipedia style site where
users can log in using Crypto-Book to edit the Wiki
anonymously and accountably. Crypto-Dissent com-
bines the Crypto-Book anonymous authentication archi-
tecture with the Dissent [7] chat system. Crypto-Drop is
a verifiable whistleblowing application that allows users
to anonymously yet credibly submit documents to jour-
nalists. We implemented OAuth provider functionality
on top of Crypto-Book to allow other applications to be
more easily built on top of Crypto-Book.
Our system is deployed and available online1 along
with source code for the system2.
We used both Facebook (via Facebook Graph
API [18]) and PayPal (via PayPal Developer API [38]) as
social network identity providers. We implemented DSA
[28], RSA [42] and Boneh-Franklin [1] elliptic curve
based key distribution systems. As RSA does not support
key splitting, our RSA implementation uses a single key
server, while for the DSA and Boneh-Franklin versions
we implemented a multi-server anytrust group with the
keys split over the multiple servers (details in Sections
1http://www.crypto-book.com
2https://github.com/jyale/blackbox
8.2.1 and 8.2.2) and deployed our key distribution sys-
tem across 10 key servers globally using PlanetLab [5].
We also implemented a Google Chrome extension to au-
tomate the process of collecting a private key from the
distributed servers. Since each key server is tied to a
different Facebook app, the user must in turn authorize
10 Facebook apps - to automate this process we imple-
mented a Chrome extension which requires only that the
user log in to Facebook a single time in order to collect
their private key.
8.1 Key Distribution Mechanism
We implemented two alternative ways of collecting and
assembling the key parts into a composite key:
• A downloadable application allowing the user to
pickup and assemble the key parts on his own machine
• A trusted web proxy
Key distribution works as follows: the user logs into
Facebook and PayPal and collects an OAuth token from
each provider. The user then sends these tokens to each
of the key servers to request their private key. Once a
key server receives a private key request and correspond-
ing OAuth token, it makes a request to the Facebook
and PayPal APIs to verify that the credentials on the
two accounts match and to obtain the user’s correspond-
ing Facebook username. If the authentication succeeds
and a valid username is returned then the key server will
lookup the corresponding private key in its database and
return it to the requester (the proxy or the desktop app).
For public key requests, the requester sends to the key
server the Facebook username that they want to obtain
the public key for, and the key server looks up the key and
returns it to the requester. If for any request the server
does not already have a keypair saved for that Facebook
username, the server will generate a keypair and store it
in its database, returning the appropriate key to the re-
quester.
Once the requester receives responses from all of the
servers it will compute the composite private and public
keys. The requester, now in possession of all necessary
keys, generates the linkable ring signature for the speci-
fied file.
8.2 Key Schemes Implemented
We implemented two different key schemes – one based
on DSA and one based on elliptic curve cryptography
(Boneh-Franklin identity based encryption) which we
describe below.
8.2.1 DSA-Based Scheme
We implemented an LRS scheme based on DSA keys.
DSA keys operate in a group G of order p and are of the
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form Y = gx mod p where Y is the public key and x is the
private key. A composite key can be formed from a set
of keys by adding the private keys and multiplying the
public keys.
Our distributed key distribution relies on the fact that
we can generate a composite private key xc from a list
of private keys x0,x1, . . . ,xn by summing them such that
xc = x0 + x1 + . . .+ xn mod q. The corresponding com-
posite public key Yc = gx0+x1+...+xn mod q mod p. This is
equivalent to multiplying the corresponding public keys
Yc = y0 ∗ y1 ∗ . . .∗ yn mod p so we can calculate the com-
posite public key without knowledge of the private keys.
8.2.2 Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption
Scheme
In addition to the DSA-based scheme, we also imple-
mented a scheme using Boneh-Franklin [1] identity-
based encryption (IBE) keys. Boneh-Franklin is a
scheme based on elliptic curves where a string such as a
user’s Facebook ID is their public key. Their private key
is generated for them by a private key generator (PKG).
We implemented a distributed PKG where a user’s pri-
vate key is split among n key servers using Shamir secret
sharing [45].
A Boneh-Franklin PKG generates a user’s private keys
using a master private key, s. The PKG multiplies this
by QID which is derived from the user’s public key, to
compute the user’s private key, Qpriv = sQID. The master
private key s can be split among n key servers by giving
each server a Shamir secret share si of the master private
key. Each key server now returns to the client a private
key part Q(i)priv = siQID. Using the appropriate Lagrange
coeffiecients λi the user can then construct their overall
composite private key Qpriv = ∑λiQ(i)priv from the private
key parts Qipriv.
We demonstrated the use of Boneh-Franklin keys by
implementing an encrypted Facebook messaging app
that allows a user to send an encrypted Facebook mes-
sage to any other Facebook user using Boneh-Franklin
identity based encryption. The recipient, even if they
have not previously registered with the service, can then
collect their private key from the key servers and decrypt
and view the message.
9 Applications
We built on our implementation from Section 8 to de-
velop three realistic applications using Crypto-Book.
These are Crypto-Wiki, Crypto-Dissent and Crypto-
Drop described below in Sections 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 re-
spectively.
9.1 Crypto-Wiki
Crypto-Wiki is a system based on the software behind
Wikipedia that allows users to log in as an accountable,
anonymous user instead of as a personally identifiable
user. This allows users to edit Wiki pages without dis-
closing their identity but at the same time provides re-
sistence to abuse. Our Crypto-Wiki system is deployed
and available online3 along with full source code for the
system4.
Crypto-Wiki provides privacy preserving accounts in-
stead of traditional accounts. Instead of having to create
a Wikipedia account in order to be able to edit pages,
users instead are able to Log in with Crypto-Book in a
similar way that many sites allow users to Log in with
Facebook. When a user chooses to log in with Crypto-
Book, they are redirected to the Crypto-Book website.
They are then required to submit a linkable ring signa-
ture (via file upload) to the Crypto-Book servers for veri-
fication. If it is valid, the servers redirect the user back to
Crypto-Wiki where they will log-in with an anonymized
account.
The anonymous ID is derived from the linkable ring
signature that the user provides. The signatures proves
that they are a member of some group and the linkage
tag is used to tell if two people signing in are the same
user. If a user signs in with Crypto-Book and then abuses
the Wiki site, the user’s linkage tag can be blocked so
they will no longer be able to access the site, ensuring
accountability.
Crypto-Wiki site administrators are able to interact
with that anonymized user in exactly the same way as
with regular, non-anonymous users (which are also sup-
ported by Crypto-Wiki). For example administrators can
message that user, interact with them on their talk page,
view their edits to the Wiki and block or ban them if nec-
essary. This allows for user accountability while simul-
taneously protecting user privacy.
9.2 Crypto-Dissent
Crypto-Dissent is a system that combines the Crypto-
Book anonymous authentication architecture with the
Dissent[7, 53] chat system. Dissent is a practical group
anonymity system that offers provable anonymity with
accountability. Crypto-Dissent is an anonymous authen-
tication platform for Dissent [7, 53], consisting of two
major components:
• Anonymous Dissent chat group creation
• Anonymous authentication to Dissent
Dissent group requests Using Crypto-Dissent, users
request Dissent chat groups as follows: The client uses
3http://www.crypto-book.com
4https://github.com/jyale/cryptowiki-faction
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their web browser to connect to the the Crypto-Book
servers. The client then generates a linkable ring sig-
nature using keys collected from the Crypto-Dissent key
servers corresponding to the Facebook users they want in
their anonymous Dissent chat group. The client sends the
ring signature to the Crypto-Dissent servers to be veri-
fied. The Crypto-Book servers then verify the ring signa-
ture. If the signature is successfully verified by Crypto-
Dissent, then Crypto-Dissent checks its database to de-
termine whether there is already a Dissent session run-
ning for that group. If there is no active Dissent session
for that group then Crypto-Dissent starts three Dissent
servers, computes a group authentication code and in-
serts a corresponding record into the database along with
the group members.
When a client is successfully authenticated by Crypto-
Dissent as being a member of the group, the servers send
the group authentication code to the client. The client
uses this authentication code to connect to the Dissent
servers: They send the authentication code to another
Crypto-Dissent service which checks the authentication
code, looks up the Dissent servers for that group and con-
neccts the user’s Dissent client to the Dissent anonymous
chat group.
Dissent anonymous authentication We also imple-
mented anonymous authentication directly within Dis-
sent using linkable ring signatures. The Dissent servers
maintain a ring of public keys for that group. When a
client attempts to connect to a Dissent server they are
challenged to provide a valid linkable ring signature cor-
responding to the ring of keys for that group. The client
generates this using their private key (which corresponds
to one of the public keys in the ring) and sends the sig-
nature to the server. The server verifies the signature
against the ring of public keys and, if successful, allows
the client to connect. Our code for performing this au-
thentication process is available on GitHub5.
9.3 Crypto-Drop
Crypto-Drop builds on SecureDrop [44], an open-source
whistleblower submission system managed by Freedom
of the Press Foundation. SecureDrop allows journalists
to accept sensitive documents from anonymous sources
via a web interface. Crypto-Drop adds credibilty to
leaks by allowing a source to anonymously sign a doc-
ument using a relevant anonymity set and the DSA based
scheme described in Section 8.2.1 before submitting it
via SecureDrop as shown in Figure 5. Upon retrieving
the document, a journalist can then verify the signature,
increasing confidence in the authenticity of the leak with-
out compromising the source’s anonymity.
5https://github.com/DeDiS/Dissent/
Figure 5: The Crypto-Drop document source interface
To retrieve a verifiably leaked document, a journalist
connects to the SecureDrop journalist web interface us-
ing Tor. They then download and decrypt any waiting
documents using their private key. At this point, Crypto-
Drop provides the additional option to verify the docu-
ment by processing the signature and retrieving the sign-
ing anonymity set. This information, combined with past
submissions associated with the codename, allows the
journalist to make a more informed decision regarding
the authenticity of the leak.
10 Evaluation
In order to evaluate how Crypto-Book scales with ring
signature group (i.e. anonymity set) size, we carried out
several experiments. We investigated the time taken for
a client to generate a signature (signing phase), the time
taken for the server to verify a signature (verification
phase), and the size of the ring signature itself. We eval-
uated our Crypto-Dissent implementation by measuring
client authentication time using our linkable ring signa-
ture scheme, also as a function of ring size. Our data
suggests linear scalability in all four scenarios.
10.1 PlanetLab deployment
In order to evaluate the time taken for a client to col-
lect their private key in a realistic system, we deployed
key servers on a distributed set of hosts using Planet-
Lab [5]. PlanetLab is a global research network con-
sisting of servers located at hundreds of universities and
other sites around the world. We chose 10 servers in geo-
graphically distributed locations (Texas, Florida, Illinois,
France, UK, Germany, Japan, Cyprus, New Zealand,
Canada) as we expect and encourage key servers to be
hosted by distinct entities, preferably in different juris-
dictions, in order to split trust among parties unlikely to
collude and hence strengthen the anytrust model. For our
10
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experiments we deployed a single key server on each of
the 10 PlanetLab nodes.
We evaluated the time required to collect a user’s com-
posite private key as a function of the number of key
servers. We further divide the time into two phases: time
to collect the access tokens and time to collect the key
part, and present our results in Figure 6. Even for a set of
10 key servers (which is unnecessarily large due to our
anytrust model), the entire key collection process com-
pletes in less than 90 seconds. The time taken to collect
the access tokens dominates as obtaining an access token
requires a redirect to Facebook, execution of the Chrome
extension, and redirect back; in contrast, retrieving a key
is a simple web request.
10.2 Signature generation
To investigate the scalability of client-side signature gen-
eration, we ran a series of tests on our Crypto-Book code.
We varied the ring size between 1000 and 10000 in in-
crements on 1000, addressing ring sizes between 2 and
1000 in smaller increments. For each ring size we mea-
sured how long it took to generate a signature and present
our results in Figure 7.
We observe that the time taken for signing scales
roughly linearly with ring size. While a ring size of
10000 is far bigger than we would expect to be used
in any real world application, our experimental results
show good scalability even at this extreme. We expect
ring sizes of at most 100 to be used in practice, requiring
on average just over half of a second (0.56s) for signing.
10.3 Verification
We conducted a similar experiment to look at the time
taken for a signature to be verified by the server. Again
we considered ring sizes between 2 and 10000. Or re-
sults, presented in Figure 7, indicate that the time taken
for signature verification scales roughly linearly with
ring size, with rings of up to 250 memebers still taking
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one second on average. We expect real applications to
use ring sizes of at most 100, making verification feasi-
ble.
10.4 Signature file size
We also looked at how the signature file size itself varied
with ring size. This is the size of the message that must
be sent by the client to the server to authenticate itself.
We investigated ring sizes between 2 and 10000 as we
did for signature generation and verification. A graph of
the results is shown in Figure 8. We found near-perfect
linear scalability in the ring signature file size with the
number of members of the ring. Ring signatures with
100 members require only 5.6KB which is small enough
to be feasible for the client to transmit over the network
to the server in a real system.
10.5 Dissent authentication
Our next experiment looked at the time required for a
client to authenticate itself with a Dissent server. We
configured a client and server with a high capacity, low
latency connection and timed at how long it took for the
client to authenticate itself using our linkable ring sig-
nature authentication scheme. Authentication requires
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that the client generate a ring signature and send it to the
server, and that the server verify the signature and notify
the client. We looked at ring sizes of 2,4,8,16 . . .16384
and carried out the experiment three times for each ring
size. Figure 9 shows the graph of the averages. We found
linear scalability in the time taken for a client to authen-
ticate with the server.
The time taken for a client to connect to the server
with no authentication was 0.01s and the time for a
client to authenticate using simple a pre-exchanged keys
(DSA based public private key verification) based login
was also 0.01s. While our linkable ring signature based
anonymous authentication is slower than this, it is still
useable: Authentication with ring sizes up to 128 took
less than one second (0.73s on average for ring size 128).
We believe that the time discrepancy between the Dis-
sent and Crypto-Wiki authentication times is likely due
to the fact that we implemented Crypto-Wiki in Python
and the Dissent authentication in C++ and C++ is known
to be faster than Python due to being a lower level pro-
gramming language.
10.6 Verifiable Whistleblowing
We evaluated Crypto-Drop in the context of additional
overhead in user workflow to submit a verifiable leak
compared to basic, unverifiable SecureDrop. We found
that, on average, the user-observable time to anony-
mously sign and submit a document was 66.5 seconds,
compared to 17.5 seconds to submit an unsigned docu-
ment.
From the perspective of a journalist, downloading and
decrypting an unsigned document required on average
27.0 seconds while the same process plus Crypto-Drop
verification took 49.8 seconds. Adding these time differ-
ences, the overall the Crypto-Drop user overhead for a
single document was 71.8 seconds - well within the ac-
ceptable range for practical use.
10.7 Code modification
We used CLOC [10] to count the lines of code that we
had to add to modify Media Wiki, Dissent, and Secure-
Drop to integrate with Crypto-Book. Only small modifi-
cations were required in all cases:
• Media Wiki required only 96 additional lines of code
to integrate it with our Crypto-Book login system (de-
ployed externally of Media Wiki).
• Dissent group request was implemented entirely out-
side of the Dissent codebase, making only command
line level calls to Dissent services, so required no mod-
ification of Dissent code.
• Dissent anonymous authentication was implemented
as an additional module to Dissent requiring 574 addi-
tional lines of code. This is in comparison to Dissent’s
pre-existing authentication system that consisted of
838 lines of code.
• SecureDrop integration with our Crypto-Book signing
system required only 35 additional lines of code.
11 Limitations and Future Work
One of the most interesting areas for future work may
be in investigating the impact different anonymity set
choices have on user privacy protection. In this pa-
per we have used a scheme where users are batched
into groups by Crypto-Book and where these groups are
shared across all third party sites and services. Future
work is required to investigate how custom, per third
party service group definition can be applied without
threatening user privacy.
A limitation of the current system is that linkable ring
signature size scales linearly with ring size. Dodis et
al. [16] proposed a scheme for constant space ring signa-
tures. These signatures also have the property that both
the signer and the verifier can perform a one-time com-
putation proportional to the size of the ring which then
allows them to produce and verify many subsequent sig-
natures in constant time. Future work could incorporate
such a scheme to reduce signing and verification time. In
subsequent work, Tsang et al. [49] proposed a scheme
for constant space accumulator based linkable ring sig-
natures. Future work could incorporate such schemes to
reduce signature size.
Another interesting line of inquiry may be investigat-
ing how our privacy protecting identities can be tied back
into anonymous posting within Facebook as is proposed
in the Faceless framework [47]. This would allow for
anonymous discussion within existing social networking
sites.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to look at what other
applications could be developed on top of Crypto-Book
using our privacy protecting identities. For exam-
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ple an anonymous group Twitter application similar to
GroupTweet [20] with improved end user privacy guar-
antees that do not require the end user to trust the service
provider with their identity.
12 Related Work
The deployment of public key cryptography over so-
cial networks was considered by Narayanan et al. [37]
where they considered key exchange over social net-
works. They considered using social networks as a pub-
lic key infrastructure (PKI), they did not implement any
applications that use the public keys.
Various schemes have been proposed to protect user
data within an online social network [33, 32, 21, 9, 25],
by encrypting the content stored within the social net-
work. However these schemes did not consider the pri-
vacy risks involved when a user uses their online social
networking identity to identify themselves with third par-
ties such as logging into other websites using their Face-
book credentials. Dey and Weis [14] proposed Pseu-
doID, a similar system based on blind signatures [3] for
privacy protected federated login, however their scheme
does not handle key assignment or Sybil resistance as
our work does. A similar blind signature based sys-
tem was proposed by Khattak et al. [26]. Watanabe
and Miyake [51] made initial efforts towards account
checking however still did not consider key assignment.
Opaak [34] is a system that attempts to provide some
Sybil resistance through relying on a cellphone as a scare
resource. SudoWeb [27] looked at limiting the amount of
Facebook information disclosed to third party sites but
did not consider fully anonymous online IDs.
Identity based encryption (IBE) refers to an encryp-
tion system where a public key can be an arbitrary string,
for example a user’s email address or social security
number. The idea was first proposed by Shamir [46]
and since then several IBE systems have been proposed
[12, 24, 36, 50, 48]. We take an IBE-inspired approach in
assigning public keys to social network users, where the
public key is deterministically computed from a user’s
social networking username. We also implemented a
Boneh-Franklin IBE distributed PKG over Facebook.
13 Conclusions
We have demonstrated Crypto-Book, a novel architec-
ture for providing privacy preserving online identities
bootstrapped off of existing social networking providers.
We have implemented three major applications – Crypto-
Wiki, Crypto-Dissent, and Crypto-Drop– on top of
Crypto-Book and shown them to have good scalability
properties. We believe that Crypto-Book is a usable,
anonymous way to provide social network users with pri-
vacy preserving online identities. There remain a large
number of areas for future research based on our archi-
tecture as well as a multitude of applications that could
be developed on top of our framework leaving open a
wide range of areas for investigation building on our re-
sults in future work.
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